WAR favourable season. At the present time there is a great scarcity of water in the Pass, and the troops would suffer much in consequence and moreover the negotiations for the release of the Prisoners would be materially affected by retracing our steps now. 2 However, when Pollock queried Clerk about his new instructions, Clerk stated that the Sikhs could not accept the occupation of Jalalabad until the British government announced its ultimate intentions towards Afghanistan.
With reference to the instructions of the Gov. Genl. ... I have the honour to inform you that the Sikh Government is at present not prepared to accept the occupation of Jullalabad. 2. It seems the Sikh Government would be glad to accept that or any other fortress in Afghanistan which the British Government might determine on abandoning but that it feels there would be much indiscretion in stepping into a prominent position in that country until a declaration by the British Government of its ultimate views should enable the Sikhs to render their measures for the security of such positions more or less extensive and circumspect according to the nature of those views. 3. Nevertheless should you be absolutely withdrawing from Jullalabad to India I think the Sikhs would without further explanation of future plans, accept Jullalabad from you; and I think it would be in accordance with the intentions of the Governor General that you should at such a time offer it to them. 3 On the same day, Clerk wrote to the Governor-General confirming Sikh interest in the proposal, subject to a number of reasonable reservations for which they requested clarification .
. . . I do the honour to state for His Lordship's information that the Lahore Government evinces considerable desire to receive possession from the British Government of either Jullalabad or Caubool, or both. 2. But before definitely engaging to hold in security or to hold at all a fort so distant as Jullalabad is from the present Sikh frontier, the Durbar seems to be anxious to ascertain the views of the British Government for the final adjustment of the entire Afghan question. 3. This is reasonable because the measures which it would be requisite for the Lahore Government to take were the British troops withdrawn from Afghanistan or to be engaged elsewhere at a great distance in Afghanistan would be more extended than those which would be necessary if only holding Jullalabad in the immediate rear· of British troops. Likewise the measures which it would be requisite for the Lahore Government to take for securing Jullalabad were the British troops to be now suddenly withdrawn would differ from those which would be taken were it intended that the British troops should withdraw only after chastising the Afghans .... 12. The next present object of the Maharaja is to ascertain what may be the plans of the British Government regarding Afghanistan for the future, with a view to acquire the remain of 11ome possessions there, but in particular to give employment and diversion to portions of his large army.' The Governor-General's reply said little that was not included in his earlier communication and failed to satisfy the Durbar. It articulated the policy of leaving Afghanistan weak, but did not elaborate on how this was to be accomplished.
2. . .. the future object of the policy of the two governments should be to maintain Afghanistan in that state in which it may be unable to do anything against us -and that the visionary design should be foregone of placing it in a state in which it should possess power and be content to use it against invaders from the west without entertaining any design of ambition against its neighbours in the east. 5 The Governor-General further repeated the offer of Jalalabad with its surrounding territories, and then picked up the Maharaja's concern over finding employment for his unruly army which fought well, but had a habit of disintegrating into a mob when not diverted, and used it as an excuse to propose stationing British troops along the Sutlej, a measure which had long been unpopular with the Lahore government.
5.
If the Lahore Government should be disposed to entertain these views, and to employ on its own account its too numerous army for the purpose of making these acquisitions, tending so much to its renown, the formation of a British Army upon the Sutlej would strongly contribute to the maintenance of tranquillity .... In re-emphasizing that acceptance of Jalalabad in the west precluded any movement to the east, the Governor-General firmly disassociated the British government from any involvement in that venture by flatly stating "that the GG will not engage in an armed intervention between the Sikhs and the Chinese although His Lordship is willing to use his good offices for their reconciliation".
Meanwhile, in Peshawar, the euphoria engendered by the successful forcing of the Khyber evaporated as old frustrations reminiscent of the early months of 1841 returned. The Lahore Durbar withheld supplies and carriage for the Sikh troops, while Sikh troops refused to advance on orders and deserted their posts to return to Peshawar to loot and plunder. General Avitabile again professed to be helpless; discipline was once more at an end. No leadership came from the Durbar's representatives in Peshawar who were nominally under the command of the Maharaja's I I -year-old son, Prince Pratab Singh.
Raja Guiab Singh announced his intention to leave for Ladakh the day after Pollock arrived in the vicinity of Jalalabad, stating that he was no longer needed now that the garrison had been relieved. The Chinese had occupied Ladakh and were but eight miles from Leh, halted only because smallpox raged inside the city. Raja Dhian Singh asked for British co-operation in defending his hill possessions from threatened retaliation by the Chinese; Raja Guiab Singh was anxious to hurry to Jammu and Ladakh to recruit troops for a venture much dearer to his heart than the British war of retribution. WAR Lawrence, with characteristic impatience, described the situation while answering Pollock's anxious queries regarding the possibilities of Sikh participation. 8 Pollock found the news about the Sikhs "very provoking" and vowed never to agree to their encamping in the same place with his troops, or even five miles apart. While the Sikhs were thus accused of dilly-dallying and vacillating, however, the British authorities were guilty oflike qualities. The heart of the problem lay in the indecision of the Governor-General and his advisers. It was this that held back the Sikhs and drove the British officers at Peshawar and Jalalabad into paroxyms of anger. The principal contention centred around the Governor-General's order to Generals Pollock and Nott to withdraw from Afghanistan. Pollock contended that immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan would "be construed into a defeat, and our character as a powerful nation would be entirely lost", that it would further hurt negotiations for the prisoners, and that it would endanger the health of his force to march through the heat of summer to Peshawar. He suggested they wait and that he advance in concert with Nott to Kabul, and then retire.
Ellenborough contended that the victory at Jalalabad could be regarded as the "signal and decisive blow" which restored the British image and that further damage would be incurred in an advance to Kabul. He was, in fact, incensed by the General's obstinate refusal to comply with his order and complained privately to his colleagues in the cabinet in London "that in not ordering the army to Ghuznee and Cabul without the means of movement or supply, and in giving up the irrational schemes of extending our dominions to the westward I stand alone and have to withstand against the whole monstrous body of political agents''. 7 He persisted in answering Pollock's practical suggestions and questions with ambiguous statements of broad policy.
The argument raged throughout May and June. Pollock was worried that any false interpretation of these vague communiques on his part would be discussed later in Parliament and disastrously affect his career, yet he stood firm. Lawrence, one of the most vociferous of the "monstrous" political agents so irritating to the Governor-General, fully supported the General and fretted over the contradictory orders which made any arrangements with the Sikhs impossible. On 16 May he wrote to Clerk with a characteristic show of temper, saying: "The Govt are tearing out our vitals, it is indeed difficult to know how to act, for what to prepare." To Shakespear, Military Secretary to Pollock at Jalalabad, he continued to rail against government ambiguity:
.. I agree with you that he [Pollock] ought not to obey; in fact the Govt letter giving or rather offering Julalabad to the Sikhs, tells him not; for it would be mere trickery to give them what they could not at present hold a day. They must ... make other arrangements before they can dispense with us. . .. There is just one fear that the Sikhs will not take Julalabad; Avitabile will endeavour to dissuade them. 8 On 31 May he was still clamouring for orders as to how to proceed: I shall be glad to hear if the Sikhs are to take Jelalabad or not. I suspect not now. You probably have told them that we are not inclined to keep up any connexion with the country. As far as I've seen of the Government letters they will put Genl. Pollock in a political fix, leaving a man who has no experience on such matters to work out his own construction of certain costive sentences embracing only the much loved general principles of expediency upon which the present Govt. seem to delight to act: it must be highly satisfactory to be General when he is puzzled to be told that he has already read his instructions in Nos. so and so -9 While waiting for instructions, Lawrence daily entreated the Sikhs to make clear their intentions. The Sikhs countered with reasonable demands for a British assurance of supplies should they be blocked at Jalalabad. Their reluctance to co-operate was understandably exacerbated by rumours of the intended British withdrawal circulating in the Peshawar bazaar. The order was still supposedly secret. Finally the Sikhs retaliated by threatening to withdraw themselves on 5 June at the end of the two-month period of commitment mutually agreed upon with General Pollock before the army left Peshawar the previous April, unless more concrete proposals were forthcoming.
In fact, the Sikhs received little encouragement from the GovernorGeneral's secret directives to Clerk, such as the following: ·
The GG has observed that in the letter of the Maharaja dated the 5th May ... and in the reported communications of Rajah Goolaub Singh that the Sikh Troops which appear to have been ordered to advance through the Khyber Pass are termed the "Stipulated Troops". 2. There is no stipulation between the British Government and the Lahore Government with respect to the advance of any Sikh Troops or to the service of any Sikh Troops with the British army. 3. The stipulation contained in the 15th article of the Tripartite Treaty for holding in readiness a body of 5,000 Mohametans for the support of the late Shah must of necessity have now ceased to have effect when the Shah has been murdered and no successor to the Throne has been recognized by either government when therefore there is no object whatever under that Treaty for which such Troops thereby stipulated could be employed. 4. The inconsiderate adoption of this expression may lead the Lahore Government or its officers to the erroneous supposition that the British Government still deems the Tripartite Treaty or part thereof to be in force whereas with respect to the provision in the 15th Article of that Treaty the GG entertains doubts whether it has been observed so as to give the Lahore Court a just claim to the payment of any part of the annual sum thereby guaranteed to the Lahore Government and with respect to the Treaty generally the Governor General has no doubt that one of the contracting parties being no longer in existence and there being no successor to such contracting party capable of executing its provisions, the Treaty is, as regards the future, altogether abrogated and null. 10 In other words, the Sikhs were to advance according to the terms of the treaty, but without the guarantees of that treaty. And with all the urging on the part of Pollock, Lawrence and Mackeson, the GovernorGeneral still refers to Raja Guiab Singh's troops as those "which appear" to have been ordered to advance. Despite such discouragingly pompous communiques, a Sikh contingent of about 4,625 cavalry and infantry, under General Guiab Singh, moved to Dakka at the western end of the Khyber Pass on 4June;on the 10th they arrivedatJalalabad and camped on the left bank of the Kabul river, some two miles from the fort. It seemed that the first step towards the acquisition of Jalalabad had been taken.
The situation at Jalalabad after the arrival of the Sikhs was, however, tense. Even two month's pay failed to mollify the troops. Quarrels broke out in the Sikh camp and the Muslim battalions of the Durbar drove General Guiab Singh out of camp and burnt his tent. As matters returned to normal, both Pollock and Lawrence, who was now in Jalalabad with Guiab Singh's camp, bombarded Clerk with long lists of measures requiring the immediate action of the Durbar should they seriously intend to take possession of Jalalabad. The Durbar should, for instance, send a Sardar of note to take command; troops, guns, supplies and plenty of cash should be sent up; 20-30 wells should be dug along the march route; 4-5 posts for from 200-500 men each should be erected along the route in addition to one large fort a mile and a half east of Ali Masjid large enough to be occupied by 1,000 men, with another 1,000 to be stationed at Ali Masjid. In all, Lawrence estimated that for the first year the Durbar must be prepared to provide 26,000 troops distributed as follows: 8,000 in the Khyber Pass; 8,000 at Jalalabad with a brigade outside it; 5,000 on the left bank of the Kabul river; and 5,000 at Pesh Bolak.
By the beginning of July the supreme council of the Governor-General seemed still to be paralysed and the Durbar was equally inattentive to the calls for action from the men in the field. No military or political direction was yet evident though rumour had it that the army would withdraw without chastising Kabul, that Jalalabad was to be given to Sultan Mohammad Khan as feudatory of the Sikhs (another ill-kept secret), and that Dost Mohammad, his exiled brother, was to be allowed to return to Kabul. The general exasperation is well illustrated in a personal letter to Clerk from Captain Mackeson, who was particularly annoyed because Lawrence had been chosen for duty in Afghanistan while he had been left at Peshawar. Outraged by the whole situation, his penchant for conjuring up bloodthirsty vengeance on the Afghans rose again.
I can not listen with patience to any arrangements for retiring without our prisoners and without our guns. -It is pitiful to be reduced to making over Jalalabad to the Sikhs -it is pitiful to think of sending back Dost Mohd.
Do the Sikhs understand that the Dost is to come back and is it with a knowledge of this that they will agree to take JalalabadThe Seikh troops will not I think be persuaded to go to Jalalabadand it will not be very creditable of them to us or to the Seikhs to make over the place to Sultan and Pir Mohammad Khan as must be in the contemplation of the Rajas -It will neither be a Rajput nor a Seikh occupation but a Barakzai occupation -To be sure we shall leave the Barakzais to cut each other's throats but I fear Sadar Sultan Mohd. and Pir Mohd will not stand long against Akbar -they being on the side of the infidels.
I hear that the Seikhs are talking of preparations for assuming possession of Jalalabad but I see no appearance of these preparations.
I shall be much obliged if you can give me some idea in a fewwords, in as far as I be required to know, of the state of your negotiations .... Have the Seikhs agreed to take possession ofit and the adjacent country for themselves or their Barak:zai feudatories ? 11 Finally, on 4 July, the Governor-General issued new orders to Generals Pollock and Nott that they might proceed to Kabul if they thought they could. The decision, however, was to be theirs, for, as he fudgingly put it, " ... the case is one in which, at this distance, I could not direct an advance, but, at the same time, I should hardly be justified in continuing to prohibit it" . 12 This produced a new deluge of letters from Pollock and Lawrence regarding Sikh preparations for taking possession of Jalalabad, all of which were summarized by the Governor-General as directives in a secret memorandum to Clerk, the last paragraph of which read:
7. The Lahore Government will feel that these suggestions are offered to them in the most kindly spirit, with the view of enabling them to render the great addition which will then be made to Sikh Dominion as valuable as possible. 13 The Sikhs, however, were apparently not convinced of either their neighbour's "kindly spirit" or of the value of the addition, especially in view of Dost Mohammad's rumoured return. The ex-Amir's reputation was still formidable. Far better to conciliate this strong-man, than incur his wrath. Besides, in terms of their own mores it seemed almost unbelievable that the British really intended to relinquish voluntarily territory they had won by the sword. Surely some trickery must be involved, especially since they were being so secretive about their intentions. The Peshawar newswriter's report sums up these reservations as he heard them discussed in the Peshawar bazaar.
I have overheard some Seikhs and Musselmans of the Punjab talking ....
They said that in the first place ... the Vakeel of the English WAR Government came to the Sircar [Maharaja Sher Singh] and said, we will give up Julalabad to you. It is necessary you should make arrangements for occupying it, and we shall withdraw our troops, and agents from the country and return to Hindoostan. The Sircar Sahib sent for Sultan Mohomed Khan and his brother and having given to them Khilat said "You now hold Ko hat, and Hashtinagar as a Jaghir and I give you also a jaghir in Peshawar, and for the subsistance of your family that is in the Punjab also, ... I will also give you a jaghir. It is necessary you should now go and take possession of Julalabad, and collect and place in the treasury the revenue of the country." The Peshawar Sirdar answered that your instructions shall be punctually acted up to, but that at J ulalabad there are great disturbances, and a government army with equipment is necessary, and you must give me my family with me; the Maharaja replied that whatever is necessary for your proceeding to Julalabad, shall be given, but to give confidence your family must remain here.
The Punjabee and Seikhs are saying amongst themselves; that Futteh Singh Man, on hearing this news was much concerned as to how the Sircar could take Julalabad from the Sahiban [British], who are so full of resources, if they give it as a present let us take it, or if they say we cannot hold it as we have a war of more importance to attend to, and you must take the country or it must be given up to the enemy. In preference to this, we will take it, and send off the army and other necessaries that it may at once become ours. If the army is destroyed, and money thrown away, it matters not; but if the Sahiban wish to resume the country after a short time, we will never cpnsent to take it, as our army may be cut up, and our money spentthen the Sahiban are strong, they will retake the country when they find it convenient.
Besides this there is a great objection and injury by taking the country for a short time; perhaps the Mussulmans may take Julalabad by force from us; in the first place we get a bad name, and secondly when the Sahiban have recovered their strength, they may take Lahore or Multan or Kashmir in lieu of Julalabad, saying I gave the latter in trust to you, and you by want of courage, have lost it; I will take the former in its place. The Sircar must on no account take the place to restore it. a From Lahore, Clerk underlined Sikh suspicions of British motives more explicitly, commenting that the Durbar's worries about the Afghans on their western frontier "are as nothing compared with its dread of the usurpations on its independence by its friends in the East" owing to acrid denunciations in the English newspapers in India and the confident manner in which they asserted that the British government would eventually take over the Punjab as a British Province. To offset possible British aggrandizement, the Sikhs wished to conclude a treaty with the British to replace the Tripartite Treaty, and Clerk saw little chance of obtaining a decision on Jalalabad until British intent to the west and to the east of the Punjab was more clearly defined. While such matters of policy were being considered in India, Pollock and Lawrence in Jalalabad continued to wrestle with incidents of declining discipline brought on by inactivity in the field. One of the Durbar's officers, Colonel Chet Singh, had arrived in the Sikh camp but he failed to call on General Pollock to discuss details regarding the handover. Instead, he returned to Peshawar in a fury on learning that cows were being slaughtered at J alalabad in violation of Article IO of the Tripartite Treaty which specifically prohibited the slaughter of kine whenever the armies of the two states were assembled at the same place. This became the cause celebre of the moment, the excuse for looting supply lines from Peshawar, and the Colonel did not return until 9 August.
Undaunted, General Pollock continued to press for action in spite of receiving such amazing pieces of correspondence as the following. Captain Lawrence was understandably furious at this bureaucratic interference in his already harried existence.
Secret Deptt. Sir, The Public Records not supplying sufficient information with respect to the circumstances under which a Sikh Force of nearly 5000 men recently advanced to Jellalabad, I am directed by the Govecnor General to request that you will call upon Captain Lawrence to make a full and corrected statement of those circumstances, as far as he is able to do so, referring in the margin of such statement to the documents by which it is supported, and showing particularly under what authority he may have acted in any part he may have taken in the transactions. 2. Major General Pollock will be requested to call upon Lieutenant Mackeson to furnish a similar statement. 15 Moreover, though the government persisted in enticing the Durbar with repeated offers of Jalalabad, they made clear that they wished to take no active role in assisting the Sikhs once they had extricated them-· selves from the country.
The G.G. cannot but infer from the questions addressed to you by the Maha Raja Shere Sing, ... that the Lahore Durbar would be now unwilling on the retirement of the British army to receive possession of Jellalabad unless the British Government were to engage to afford aid in troops or in money to the Durbar for the purpose of enabling them to hold it. 2. The Governor General cannot consent to enter into any such engagement, nor can he hold out any expectation that such aid will be afforded. The objections thereto are obvious on our part; and the Maha Raja himself would on consideration see that the perpetual intervention which would be ~hereby necessarily occasioned in the management of his government and the direction of his army in Afghanistan would be calculated to impair the good understanding which now happily subsists between the British Government and that of Lahore. 16 .In ~h_is s~me .letter: ~~w.ev~r,. M.a~d.ock ~rote that should the Maharaja 186 JALALABAD DURING THE FIRST ANGLO-AFGHAN WAR wholly and absolutely without reserve or condition". By the time Pollock moved out from Jalalabad towards Kabul on 20 August, no word had been received from the Durbar concerning the future destiny of the fort, and a new argument arose.
The Sikh Brigade had, by order of General Pollock, commenced recrossing the Kabul river on 19 August for the purpose of proceeding to Gandamak and taking a position in its neighbourhood to facilitate the march to Kabul. Pollock had also consented, on Lawrence's pleading, to take from 400 to 500 Sikh cavalry with him to Kabul but General Guiab Singh insisted that half his brigade be taken. Half the Sikh contingent had moved into Jalalabad by the 20th, but the young Prince Pratab Singh in Peshawar refused to order the Durbar troops to advance to Gandamak without permission from his father, the Maharaja.
On 6 September, however, a detachment of 300 infantry, 200 cavalry, 5 camel guns and IO long jezails joined Pollock's camp with a view to taking part in the advance on Kabul. Raja Guiab Singh was willingly co-operative; Colonel Chet Singh was not, and "behaved ill throughout". Eight hundred men from the Sikh contingent were left at Gandamak, and others remained at Jalalabad and at Sultanpur, mid-way between. Nearly all the cavalry and four-fifths of the infantry taking part in this campaign were Muslim. Pollock and his Sikh detachment left Gandamak for Kabul on 7 September and the British flag was once again hoisted over the Bala Hissar on the 16th. On the way the Sikhs took part in several battles and were generally complimented on their gallantry.
It was a time of victory on all fronts, for the Sikhs at this very same time gained a victory in Ladakh over the Lhasa troops after months of discouraging reverses. In Peshawar, the Sikhs fired a salute in honour of their victories, and in the vicinity of Tashigong the two armies negotiated for peace.
In Kabul, the prisoners returned to join their comrades and the army busied itself in acts of retribution, the Sikh detachment participating in the destruction of numerous sites associated with former British humiliations. The army left Kabul on 12 October and still there was no word from the Durbar regarding Jalalabad. Clerk reported political manoeuvrings for the plum within the Durbar between the Maharaja and the Jammu faction led by General Guiab Singh's brother, Raja Dhian Singh, the Wazir. Each viewed the other with distrust, and both continued to suspect British designs on the Punjab.
3. Raja Dhian Singh and his partisan Sooltan Mohamad Khan would gladly close with the offer on the conditions required by the Right Honourable the Governor General. 4. The Maharaja and his Sikhs have little doubt but that Jullalabad and the surrounding territory might thus without much trouble be nominally annexed to the Khalsa domains, but they apprehend that the Raja and his partisan might only retain the acquisition too firmly.17
If the Durbar was hesitant, the Governor-General was not. His orders to General Pollock were clear, and they were written in his own hand instead of being conveyed throu2h his Secretarv
